This essay makes the case for an alternative approach to the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, one rooted in the classical natural law tradition. The foundation of my alternative approach is built on a reconstruction of the jurisprudence of one of the European Court of Human Right’s most heterodox judges – Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who was the United Kingdom’s nominated judge between 1974-1980. In his dissents, concurrences, and writings, I argue, are the conceptual and normative seeds from which a more promising approach to interpreting the Convention can be grown.

My alternative approach does not represent a repudiation of the moral purpose or point of the Convention but is in keeping with one of the principal moral impetus’ behind its creation: the desire to protect the most basic and fundamental human rights that are owed as a matter of justice to all persons.  I also suggest this alternative method would, if adopted, deflate a great deal of the legal and political critique directed toward the Court.