Abstract
With the expansion of wireless technology, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are emerging as a promising approach for realizing smart cities and addressing many serious traffic problems, such as road safety, convenience, and efficiency. To avoid any possible rancorous attacks, employing lightweight ciphers is most effective for implementing encryption/decryption, message authentication, and digital signatures for the security of the VANETs. Light encryption device (LED) is a lightweight block cipher with two basic keysize variants: LED-64 and LED-128. Since its inception, many fault analysis techniques have focused on provoking faults in the last four rounds to derive the 64-bit and 128-bit secret keys. It is vital to investigate whether injecting faults into a prior round enables breakage of the LED. This study presents a novel impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis on a prior round. A detailed analysis of the expected number of faults is used to uniquely determine the secret key. It is based on the propagation of truncated differentials and is surprisingly reminiscent of the computation of the complexity of a rectangle attack. It shows that the impossible meet-in-the-middle fault analysis could successfully break the LED by fault injections.