Abstract
•This is the first analytical paper which studies anti-counterfeiting in a retail platform under dual-channel competition.•This work is the first one focusing on the incentives for the platform and the manufacturer to invest in anti-counterfeiting technology under dual-channel competition.•We uncover that the payoff of anti-counterfeiting in the retail platform is not always positive and anti-counterfeiting may harm consumer surplus and social welfare.
The retail platform has developed rapidly, but the problem of fake products has also become increasingly severe. This paper investigates the impact of anti-counterfeiting in a retail platform and the incentives for the platform and the manufacturer to invest in anti-counterfeiting technology by using a game-theoretic model. We consider that the product can be sold directly by the manufacturer, or indirectly through a reseller on the platform. The reseller might also sell fake products, but the platform and the manufacturer can use anti-counterfeiting technology to fight against the fakes. Our analysis shows that the payoff of anti-counterfeiting in the retail platform is not always positive. Specifically, when the production valuation is low, the anti-counterfeiting payoff for the platform (the manufacturer) is negative if the proportion of fakes is sufficiently low (high). We also find that anti-counterfeiting may harm consumer surplus and social welfare. In addition, if the investment cost of anti-counterfeiting is high, at most one firm, either the platform or the manufacturer, has the incentive to invest in anti-counterfeiting contingent on the relative valuation on the platform’s services. Finally, with the investment in anti-counterfeiting, the platform should provide better services than before for surviving in the market.