Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks

Pieter Ceelen; Sjouke Mauw; Sasa Radomirovic

doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2007.12.015

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Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks

Journal article

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Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks

Pieter Ceelen, Sjouke Mauw and Sasa Radomirovic

Electronic notes in theoretical computer science, Vol.197(2), pp.31-43

22/02/2008

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.entcs.2007.12.015

Abstract

Computer Science

Computer Science, Theory & Methods

Science & Technology

Technology

In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks arising from this capability. Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable to this type of attack are given, including Lowe's modification of KSL. The consequences for automatic verification tools are discussed.

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Title: Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks
Creators: Pieter Ceelen - University of Luxembourg
Sjouke Mauw - University of Luxembourg
Sasa Radomirovic - University of Luxembourg
Publication Details: Electronic notes in theoretical computer science, Vol.197(2), pp.31-43
Publisher: Elsevier
Number of pages: 13
Publication Date: 22/02/2008
Grant note: Centre de Recerca Matematica Postdoctoral Fellowship
Identifiers: 99783546002346; WOS:000214272600004
Academic Unit: Department of Computer Science; School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article

Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks

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