Abstract
The war in Ukraine has put energy security front
and centre once again. Energy transformations have
bubbled away in the EU with predictable familiarity:
rising and falling in tandem with geopolitical shifts or
climate change pressures. 2022 however has been
an epochal year in European energy terms, and 2023
and beyond are likely to be just as seismic. The EU has
folded energy security, sustainability, foreign and security
policy, strategic autonomy and trade into one enormous
package, and used it to both cohere itself as
anegotiating actor, and render itself influential with
regional and global powers, from Ukraine and Russia to
the US, NATO and the UN. Some turning points are long
overdue, including the broader area of European energy
security. Others, in terms of possibilities by which to
overhaul the European oil, gas, electricity and renewable
markets, have come online in a more radical fashion.
There are however, two clear themes to be considered.
First, the largely joint efforts made by the EU to break
the asymmetric dependence on Russian fossil fuels.
Second, the collective approach to tackling the
consequent energy crisis brought on by the interruption
of gas supplies at regional, market and individual levels.
As this CBE Policy Paper explores, there is much context
that needs to be set out, in order to fully understand the
sweeping nature of some of the energy mobilisation that
has taken place in the EU’s attempt to move towards a
form of energy independence. It is easy enough to cite
the statistical drop in numbers of imported Russian gas
to the EU from roughly 40% to 9%, or list the series of
EU policies that have arisen throughout 2022, including
REPowerEU, the revamped ‘Fit For 55’ and European
Green Deal. But the wider transition that the EU is now
embarking upon requires reflection, before identifying
the current challenges and proposing policy options.
As the Policy Paper illustrates, energy security itself
is a highly contested definition, depending on which
end of the metaphorical pipeline one finds oneself.
Each Member State is also approaching the energy
crisis from different standpoints, whether they be
geographical (e.g. proximity to Russia), financial, political
and domestic. Some are keener on energy autonomy –
and the costs incurred - than others. Some are
independently-minded in approaching the ensuing
changes, others are keen to work with the EU, still
others are determined to ensure market forces and
energy actors take precedence over policies.
The results will need to produce an EU far more
effective in managing its energy needs autonomously
than previously, combining ambitions for strategic
autonomy to robustly bolster its foreign and security
policy, with demands for a socially just and equitable
transition in implementing an ambitious climate policy.
Whatever the outcome, what lies ahead is an
unparalleled opportunity for the EU to recast itself
as a coherent regional energy actor.