I will argue that Dworkin’s limiting condition of dignity, whose defining pillars are self-respect and authenticity, cannot establish the required boundaries to guarantee a place for morality in the ethical domain. As a result the ‘constructive model’does not offer a genuine integration between morality and ethics. On the contrary, morality is pushed aside and the remaining space is for ethical responsibilities alone. In Dworkinean language what is left is ‘living well’, i.e. striving to have a good life without limiting conditions. I show that under Dworkin’s constructive model, the ‘source’of the performance and activities in our striving to live well is not necessarilyour rational nature.

In§2 I discuss Dworkin’s idea of dignity and his constructive model with the aim of overcoming the separation between morality and ethics. In §3 I contrast Dworkin’s notion of dignity with the Kantian notion of dignity and show that my reading of the Kantian conception of dignity provides opportunity for the integration of ethics and morality. I also discuss a possible objection to my proposal.