Abstract
I am immensely grateful to the commentators for their insightful challenges to Criminally Ignorant.1 I’ve learned a tremendous amount from grappling with their objections and am indebted to them for their thought-provoking responses. They’ve revealed many things I wish I’d done differently in the book, but their objections are illuminating and push toward better understanding.
Here I discuss five groups of central concerns, though due to space limitations, I cannot address many of their important points. Specifically, I will discuss: (1) concerns about the wilful ignorance doctrine (Child and Dsouza); (2) methodological concerns (Webster); (3) skepticism raised by numerous commentators (Donnelley-Lazarov, Dsouza, Webster and Wieland) about my view that criminal law should generally be motive-insensitive; (4) conceptual worries about the commensurability of my manifestation account and its competitor the causal account (Wieland); (5) concerns about my defense of the collective knowledge doctrine for corporate crimes (Krebs). Throughout, I use ‘K’, ‘WI’, ‘R’ and ‘IR’ to denote knowledge, wilful ignorance, recklessness and insufficient regard, respectively.