Abstract
In this paper, we first review the existing proofs of the Boneh-Franklin identity-based encryption scheme (BF-IBE for short), and show how to admit a new proof by slightly modifying the specifications of the hash functions of the original BF-IBE. Compared with prior proofs, our new proof provides a tighter security reduction and minimizes the use of random oracles, thus indicates BF-IBE has better provable security with our new choices of hash functions. The techniques developed in our proof can also be applied to improving security analysis of some other IBE schemes. As an independent technical contribution, we also give a rigorous proof of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation in the case of CPA-to-CCA, which demonstrates the efficiency of the FO-transformation (CPA-to-CCA), in terms of the tightness of security reduction, has long been underestimated. This result can remarkably benefit the security proofs of encryption schemes using the FO-transformation for CPA-to-CCA enhancement.