Abstract
Purpose - The purpose of this study is to examine the association between non-audit service fees provided by the auditor and auditor independence in stable and unstable economic conditions. Further, this study investigates whether client importance impairs auditor independence in two different Australian economic environments.
Design/methodology/approach - This study focuses on financially distressed firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2014. The data is obtained from SIRCA and the Morning Star databases. The probit method is used as a baseline regression model, the two-stage least squares and the sensitivity of control variable tests are used to control for any endogeneity and self-selection bias concerns.
Findings - This study shows that in stable economic conditions, non-audit service fees provided by auditors impair auditor independence. This suggests that economic bonding between auditor and client serves as a threat to the auditor's independence, perhaps because of the importance given to the larger clients. In contrast, the authors find no association between non-audit service fees and auditor independence in unstable (highly regulated) economic conditions largely because of higher litigation risk. The results of this study are robust to alternative model specifications and endogeneity concerns.
Practical implications - This study provides an important implication to regulators that macro-economic conditions influence the strength of incentives related to non-audit services for auditors. Furthermore, this study enhances the understanding of regulators (Australian Security Investment Commission) and the strategies adopted by Australian auditors in response to economic incentives and market-based incentives.
Originality/value - The authors contribute to the existing literature by providing evidence that there is a tradeoff between market-based incentives (i.e. lower litigation costs) and economic incentives (i.e. non-audit services fees) with economic uncertainty influencing the importance of these incentives to auditors.