Abstract
In this article, I shall explore the role of oblique intention in the law of complicity. I shall use the recent Supreme Court decision from the United Kingdom in R. v. Gnango to argue the case for recognizing oblique intention as an alternative mental element in complicity. R. v. Gnango also raises the issue of transferred intention and transferred de-fenses, so I will explore those doctrines in the context of the law of com-plicity. A further issue raised in R. v. Gnango is the scope of the victim rule. Since the victim rule has implications for the transferred intention and transferred defense doctrines and ultimately for the fault and conduct elements for complicity, I examine it in the third part of this article. In this article, it is argued that the victim rule applies in all cases apart from where an innocent third party is harmed. Coupled with this, it is argued that when a person forces another to kill in lawful and justi-fied defense (i.e., where D holds innocent V hostage and open fires on armed police) D is liable for the harm caused to V when the police return fire and kill V. Per contra, if the police kill a co-perpetrator of a crime, there is no residual wrongful harm, and thus D is not liable for the death of his co-perpetrator. The co-perpetrator’s death is the result of the po-lice acting lawfully and justifiably, as is the death of the innocent third party, but the aggressor who is killed by police is not wrongfully harmed by her co-perpetrator because the victim herself forces police’s hand. The police do not wrong an aggressor who is killed by them acting in lawful defense. Per contra, when the police kill an innocent hostage while trying to lawfully arrest the hostage taker, the hostage is wrongfully harmed. The hostage taker who culpably causes the police to harm her by forcing the police to shoot at him while he holds the hostage directly wrongs the innocent hostage.