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Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation
Journal article   Open access  Peer reviewed

Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

J Evans, P Levine and F Trillas
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol.26(1), pp.17-40
01/01/2008

Abstract

Social Sciences Economics Business & Economics ECONOMICS under-investment political equilibrium capture delegation MONETARY-POLICY COMMITMENT TRANSPARENCY CREDIBILITY COMPETITION FIRMS
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