Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

J Evans; P Levine; F Trillas

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003

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Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

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Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

J Evans, P Levine and F Trillas

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol.26(1), pp.17-40

01/01/2008

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.003

Abstract

Social Sciences

Economics

Business & Economics

ECONOMICS

under-investment

political equilibrium

capture

delegation

MONETARY-POLICY

COMMITMENT

TRANSPARENCY

CREDIBILITY

COMPETITION

FIRMS

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Title: Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation
Creators: J Evans
P Levine
F Trillas
Publication Details: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, Vol.26(1), pp.17-40
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
Date published: 01/01/2008
Date submitted: 03/04/2012
Identifiers: 99511224002346
Academic Unit: School of Economics
Language: English
Resource Type: Journal article

Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation

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