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Large Games with Countable Characteristics
Journal article   Open access  Peer reviewed

Large Games with Countable Characteristics

GMB Carmona
Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol.44(3-4), pp.344-347
2008

Abstract

We consider anonymous games with an atomless probability space of players in which players' characteristics are countable. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies together with the function assigning characteristics to players. This results implies the existence of Nash equilibria in continuous large games with countable characteristics.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.011View
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