Abstract
Economic inequality and corruption are two extremely harmful phenomena whose causes and consequences
share a recursive relationship as higher levels of one lead to an increase of the other phenomenon, and viceversa. Uslaner (2008) named this relationship the Inequality Trap. So far, the inequality trap has been
explored mainly from an economic perspective. However, the author posited that one issue offers a breeding
ground for the other by creating a socio-psychological climate that makes the status quo perceived as
inevitable. This research presented in this thesis is a first attempt to tackle the inequality trap from a sociopsychological perspective. In Chapters 1- 3, I will introduce the current literature concerning the perception
and the effects of economic inequality and corruption and how their recursive relationship is shaped. In
Chapter 4, I will discuss the antecedents of protest highlighted by the literature, to better identify the ones
that may be involved for shaping people’s intentions of contrasting the inequality trap. In Chapter 5, I will
present three studies investigating the topic of the inequality trap by recruiting an Italian sample (Study 1: N
= 158), a British student sample (Study 2: N = 114), and a British sample (Study 3: N = 233). Using a fictional
scenario, I manipulated participants’ perception of economic inequality, corruption, and their subjective
socio-economic status while assessing their anger reaction, their behavioural intentions for contrasting
economic inequality and corruption, and their preference for the taxation system. Throughout the samples,
I consistently found that being exposed to higher levels of economic inequality and corruption raised
participants’ willingness to engage in actions for contrasting economic inequality and corruption,
respectively. The effects of the manipulations were fully mediated by their anger response. Being exposed to
higher levels of economic inequality (or corruption) raised participants’ levels of anger which, in turn,
significantly predicted their willingness to contrast corruption (or economic inequality). Hence, the inequality
trap influences people’s contrasting intentions at least through an emotional mechanism. In Chapter 6, I will
present two studies that further explored the inequality trap with Italian and British samples. I used the same
fictional scenario employed for the studies reported in Chapter 5, but I manipulated one phenomenon at the
time and assessed participants’ inferences of other one, while measuring participants’ emotional responses
in terms of anger and hope, their behavioural intentions for contrasting economic inequality and corruption,
and their equality preferences. The results showed that people use information about corruption to draw
inferences about economic inequality (Study 4a: N = 147/Study 5a: N = 121), and information about
economic inequality to draw inferences about corruption (Study 4b: N= 111/Study 5b: N= 126). Additionally,
I found that participants’ inferences concerning corruption made them more willing to contrast economic
inequality, whereas their inferences about economic inequality did not lead them to display higher
behavioural intentions of contrasting corruption. I explained this result by speculating that people’s may
display a higher tolerance towards economic inequality than corruption and perceive the former more
negatively when they infer its relationship with corruption. In Chapter 7, two studies exploring this
speculation will be presented. Once again, I considered an Italian (Study 6: N = 190) and a British sample
(Study 7: N = 391). To understand the participants’ tolerance of inequality over corruption, I adapted the
Tajfel’s matrices (Tajfel et al., 1979). Participants were asked to select, among different alternatives, the
combination of economic inequality and corruption that they deemed optimal for the fictional society they
imagined being a citizen of. Such relative preference was explored also through a zero-sum task and a
distribution of resources task. Finally, I explored if such relative preference was influenced by the saliency of
economic inequality and corruption, which I manipulated by making participants watch a brief video.
Throughout the samples and tasks, I found a consistent tolerance of economic inequality over corruption,
meaning that participants were more willing to tolerate higher levels of the former as long as it meant having
lower levels of the latter. Such tolerance was not affected by the saliency manipulation. Finally, in Chapter
8, I will discuss the results obtained along with their implications and future directions.