Abstract
Water and its related problems constitute the core of poverty. At the United Nations summit in 2000, world leaders agreed to halve the percentage of population without sustainable access to safe drinking water. As much as 50 percent of residents in urban centres across the developing world rely on what are referred to in this research as small-scale and independent providers (SIPs). However, these providers are not accorded the protection and support which is given to official providers. They charge higher prices and the quality of water is very poor. No legal framework exists for regulating competition, price and quality of water provided by SIPs. This research investigates how legal frameworks for the regulation of SIPs can be established in the context of two case studies: Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Kisumu (Kenya). First, it examines whether there is a need to regulate the price and safety of water provided by SIPs. It analyses this question within the normative framework of the public interest theory of regulation. It argues that there is a need for regulating the safety of water and for adopting regulatory and non-regulatory instruments to increase affordability of SIPs. This need is transformed into an obligation to regulate because of the right to water. The research also addresses the issue of how to effectively and appropriately regulate the safety of water provided by SIPs. SIPs are the micro enterprises of the water sector. Therefore, the propriety of regulating them might be questioned considering that regulation generally imposes heavier burden on small enterprises. However, instead of exempting SIPs from water safety regulations, the research argues for a ‘differentiated regulation’. In addition, the sheer number of SIPs and their largely informal nature implies that a different model of regulation is needed, one that relies largely on collaboration and voluntary compliance.