This thesis concerns (a) an analysis of Kant’s idea of dignity and (b) how this conception can be constructive when applied to juridical thinking, particularly concerning domestic violence issues within international human rights and refugee law. This Kantian idea of dignity is grounded in a status interpretation that shows that exercising internal freedom is, in Kant’s words, the ‘innate dignity’^[1] of a human being. This capacity is identified as a process of practical reasoning when an agent exercises their self-regarding duties, which are the duties of self-esteem and self-mastery. Thus, the thesis offers a perspective of juridical thinking that considers dignity’s fullest potential as an object of intelligibility, emphasising the importance of our imperfect obligations. These duties encompass latitude, and I will show that such latitude is also apparent when thinking about how judges must apply and interpret certain legal principles, such as the principle of effectiveness and living instrument doctrine.  

This thesis argues that the legal use of dignity forsakes its depth and theoretical rigour, and the rationed use of dignity in domestic violence jurisprudence evidences its current misinterpretation and misuse. To address this, I identify three broad conceptions of dignity in existing scholarly literature: i) the value interpretation, ii) the status account, and iii) the sceptical approach. The value interpretation conceives dignity as an intrinsic human value and explains that our dignity is why we have rights. This account is evident in human rights law and coined the contemporary approach to dignity. The status account encapsulates two different versions: ' dignity as rank’ and ‘intelligible dignity.’ Dignity as rank is superficial and focuses on material aspects such as job, office, or rank. In contrast, intelligible dignity is the product of practical reasoning, where an agent prioritises their duty over desires and material interests. The sceptics reject dignity's importance and focus their criticism on the value interpretation because it fails to provide an appropriate ground for dignity. I agree with the sceptics, adopt an anti-value reading of dignity, and follow the theorists who advocate a status conception of dignity that is initially non-relational because it gives primacy to self-regarding duties and unveils the depth and potential of our imperfect obligations.  

I propose a theoretical framework and hypothesis providing insight into our interpretative judging capacity. I then apply the framework and hypothesis to expose the limits of juridical thinking about dignity and domestic violence. The novelty is my use of self-regarding duties, focusing on the potential of our imperfect obligations when applied to juridical thinking; this is because the law is centred on external freedom and is unconcerned with the personal motivations of agents. However, the commonality between duties of right (lex) and virtue (ethica)  is the individual agent who is subject to their duty and thinking about dignity as an object of intelligibility emphasises the potential of our imperfect obligations in all settings to provide us with a better moral education. Thus, our duties appear to us in an intermingling and interwoven fashion in all settings.[2]The thesis makes a compelling argument for seriously considering the role of imperfect obligations in juridical thinking and posits that these duties appear to us in all settings. Thus, practical reasoning merges the realms of virtue and right when faced with thinking and making decisions that have moral significance, such as domestic violence. The extent we exercise our imperfect obligations will be significant in these moments.

The thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research and the issue, while Chapter 2 sets out the framework and hypothesis. Chapters 3 -5 apply the framework and its hypotheses, demonstrating how thinking about the judge’s self-regarding duties can provide insight into intelligible dignity and current rigid juridical thinking about domestic violence. The concluding comments in chapter six give a summary and closure to the thesis.

Dignity is a concept underutilised in domestic violence case law in international human rights and refugee law. However, there is a crucial difference. In the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), dignity is frequently referred to in the context of numerous substantive Articles, such as Articles 2, 3, 5, and 8. Jurisprudentially, the case of SW v United Kingdom.^[3] Despite the frequent references to dignity in the context of numerous substantive Articles in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), including those related to domestic violence, there is a disparity in the usage of dignity in general Article 3 ECHR jurisprudence and domestic violence case law. This research argues for the urgent need to bridge this gap. It applies the framework’s conception of dignity to juridical thinking to expose the current gaps in the law and show that thinking about our imperfect duties is essential in all realms.

I will evidence the issues in human rights and refugee law by critically analysing the framework’s hypothesis that self-regarding duties have primacy. This is insightful because it unpacks an interpretative point on internal freedom and shows why thinking more deeply about imperfect obligations in all realms is essential. It will also highlight the limits of current juridical thinking about domestic violence.  

[1]Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Mary Gregor and Roger Sullivan (eds) and (trs) (Cambridge University Press 2015). Hereinafter referred to as MM.References to Kant’s works are to the volume and page of the pages referred to in the Prussian Academy edition of his works, which are referred to in the margins of the English translations cited. MM 6:420.

[2] Barbara Herman, ‘The Moral Habitat’ (Oxford University Press 2023).

[3] Application no 20166/92 (ECtHR, 22^nd November 1995), para 44.