Abstract
This enquiry into the relationship between the authority of the state and the freedom of the individual is conducted through the medium of a philosophical model of society initially conceived of as a political community with the individual in the role of citizen. The model is developed by introducing the notion of the state as subsuming the political community, and positing the individual first in terms of personhood derived from his parent state, and then in terms of autonomy. The logical relationship between the state as a complex of rule-governed situations and the freedom-seeking individual is examined. Within this context, the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit is introduced and developed as a concept indicative of the individual's obligation to his native state. Moreover, the challenge which Kantian-inspired autonomy may be held to pose to the state's authority is explored and found to be misconceived. The basis of the state's authority is then examined through an enquiry into the legitimation of law. The implications of Rousseau's notion of the general will are analysed and found to be consistent with Kant's universal principle of right as offering a criterion by which to evaluate the justice of law. By situating the principle within the social context of the state the principle can be given a content, a content which it is the purpose of the political community to determine. Finally, the presuppositions on which the model is based are shown to be generally consistent with aspects of Popperian epistemology.