How do great powers behave when they experience relative decline? This study makes the argument that the behaviour of great powers in modern capitalism, expressed internationally, is best interpreted as a race for wealth among uneven racers. Each participant joins the race by erecting an international economic zone designed to accrue maximum income. But great powers’ uneven power positions, produced through technology gaps, drive each power to employ distinct zone architectures, varied “building blocks” as well as divergent modes of interacting with the rest of the racers.

Based on the “race-for-wealth” analogy, this study focuses on those great powers which fail to keep up, or who lose part or all of their lead in a dynamic race for innovation. It more specifically constructs four types of great power “laggards”, each experiencing a distinct type of an adverse relative power shift. In exploring how each of these power positions plays out, I analyse the grand strategies of Great Britain and France from the end of the Napoleonic Wars up until the turbulent interwar period.