Abstract
In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how the law provides reasons for action that draws from the moral philosopher Bernard Williams. A first claim I make regards how concrete agents reason. I will put forward a view that takes into account the projects, values, attachments, and dispositions that agents have. This picture is a kind of “reasons internalism” that combines Williams’ original claims with Harry Frankfurt’s structure of care. Once we have that picture, I provide an account of motivations and dispositions that agents have, notably the notions of character, identity and respect. Alongside those discussions, I analyse a second claim. Drawing from Joseph Raz and John Deigh, I argue that, given law’s part in a narrative of political rule, it is a characteristic feature of law that it demands respect from its subjects; respect here meaning that the subjects at least see some good or value in the law that grounds at least reasons to not act against it. There are, then, considerations moving from two directions: from one side, we have law’s demand for respect moving from the law to the subjects; from the other, the contents of peoples’ “subjective motivational sets” that enable agents to make sense of law’s demand and abide by them when the requisite relationships between law and agents are present. For instance, an agent might identify herself with the law, or she might respect it but see it as something she does not identify herself with, or she might simply abide by the law because of prudential reasons or similar considerations. Those relationships account for much of law’s power to provide reasons for action. I hope to present a view on the reason-giving character of the law that takes seriously the phenomenology of action from a first-personal point of view.