Abstract
In the UK and the United States, anti-discrimination law prohibits disparate treatment and disparate impact, on protected grounds, such as race, sex, etc. Workers who use the legislation, or assist others to do so, need protection against retaliation by their employer. Accordingly, the legislation seeks to remove deterrents by creating a fourth instance of discrimination, known as retaliation. The statutory formula is limited, apparently providing employers no defence (see e.g. EEOC v Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities and University Professionals of Illinois (957 F 2d 424 (7th Cir 1992)). Yet in some cases, courts sympathetic to the employer have strained the formula to provide what amounts to a benign motive defence (e.g. US v New York City Transit Authority 97 F 3d 672 (2nd Cir 1996)). The result is an incoherent body of case law. This paper explores the problem in Britain and the United States, and attempts to settle upon a new statutory formula that would provide certainty and clarity, as well as fulfilling the ambition of the anti-retaliation doctrine.